Let's continue our look at the recommendations issued by the Baker Panel in the wake of the BP Texas City refinery explosion of March 2005. Although addressed to BP, the recommendations carry a powerful message for all safety directors.

6. SUPPORT FOR LINE MANAGEMENT

BP should provide more effective and better coordinated process safety support for the U.S. refining line organization.

7. LEADING & LAGGING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROCESS SAFETY

BP should develop, implement, maintain and periodically update an integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators for more effectively monitoring the process safety performance of the U.S. refineries by BP's refining line management, executive management (including the Group Chief Executive) and Board of Directors. In addition, BP should work with the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and with industry, labor organizations, other governmental agencies and other organizations to develop a consensus set of leading and lagging indicators for process safety performance for use in the refining and chemical processing industries.

8. PROCESS SAFETY AUDITING

BP should establish and implement an effective system to audit process safety performance at its U.S. refineries.

9. BOARD MONITORING

BP's Board should monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Panel (including the related commentary) and the ongoing process safety performance of BP's U.S. refineries. The Board should, for a period of at least five calendar years, engage an independent monitor to report annually to the Board on BP's progress in implementing the Panel's recommendations (including the related commentary). The Board should also report publicly on the progress of such implementation and on BP's ongoing process safety performance.

10. INDUSTRY LEADER

BP should use the lessons learned from the Texas City tragedy and from the Panel's report to transform the company into a recognized industry leader in process safety management. The Panel believes that these recommendations, together with the related commentary in Section VII, can help bring about sustainable improvements in process safety performance at all BP U.S. refineries.

Conclusion

Hopefully, other companies will heed the solid advice of the Baker Panel. Share them with your senior management team. You can present the report in a work shop or use it as a case study in your next safety leadership course.

And ask yourself the following questions: Do you have opportunities to improve based on the Baker recommendations? Or are you another BP waiting to happen?

MEMBER REPLY

Reaction to the Baker Report

Dear Wayne:

I have been watching the BP incident and Baker report unfold from the beginning. I've reviewed the internal reports, a safety management investigation report issued under the direction of John Mogford, the internal root cause analysis, the BP directed independent audit lead by James Stanley, the OSHA citations and finally the Baker report itself. Based on this reading, I have come to my own conclusions.

First let me say, I agree with Baker's team, as I am sure would Stanley's team and those from BP who initially investigated the incident.

One thing noticeably absent from all of these reports was the mention of a failure to have a required plan in place. I can only assume that the plans required were in place (which is hinted at). In other words, the plan must have failed. I would add this to the list of failures. Others on the list:

• Top down safety failed;
• Hazard control failed;
• Change control failed;
• Hazard awareness failed; and
• Communications failed.

For a safety plan (control) to succeed, the people who do the work need to be in the middle of it. The people who manage them need to be a consistent and constant support to the overall goal of safety. All of the controls that Baker group has suggested will only work if the "plan" becomes a daily part of every employee's work day. BP needs to get it off the shelf and into the hearts and minds of its employees at all levels.

Jim Scarr
Safety Officer
King County
Department of Natural Resources and Parks
Solid Waste Division

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Wayne's Reply

Dear Jim:

My comment about the possible implications to those who read the article would be simple: "Do you see yourself or your organization within the context of the Baker Report?"

Basically, if one were to conduct a gap analysis of one's own HSE management system, juxtaposed with the recommendations of the Barker Report, what would one find, if they were factual and pointed in their gap analysis?

That is my message: Put yourself in BP's shoes, and mirror the Barker report to your own organization's safety management system as a due diligence exercise and see what you get. And if you identify gaps, fill them.

Wayne Pardy
Vice President
Q5 Systems Limited

A CANADIAN TRAGEDY

The Halifax Explosion

By Glenn Demby

In response to last Wednesday's report on the BP Texas City tragedy, I received the following note:

If SafetyXChange is going to reflect on workplace tragedies, it's only fair to include those that have occurred here in Canada. For example, why don't you describe the Halifax Explosion, which happened 90 years ago today?

Lisa Tkaczuk
Dec. 6, 2007

*********

Okay, Lisa. I will.

The tragedy Lisa is referring to occurred on Dec. 6, 1917. At 7.30 a.m., the French ship Mont-Blanc left her anchorage in Halifax, Nova Scotia, outside the mouth of the harbor to join a convoy escorted by heavy warships that was gathering in Bedford Basin. It was during World War I and Mont-Blanc was bound for Europe loaded with 2,300 tons of wet and dry picric acid, 200 tons of TNT, 10 tons of gun cotton and 35 tons of benzol, a highly explosive mixture.

The Atlantic crossing would subject the convoy to the menace of German U-boats. But it wasn't a torpedo that would seal Mont-Blanc's fate. After a series of ill-judged maneuvers, Mont-Blanc collided with the Imo, a Norweigan vessel bound for New York to pick up relief supplies for Belgium. Although it was just a glancing blow, it was enough to start a fire aboard Mont-Blanc.

The ship blazed for about 20 minutes and came to rest against Pier 6 in the busy industrial north end of Halifax known as the Richmond district. A crowd gathered to gawk at the spectacle, oblivious to the danger. At 9:05 a.m., the Mont-Blanc exploded. In addition to disintegrating the ship, the blast leveled churches, houses, schools, factories and docks. The captain, pilot and five crew members of Imo were killed. Miraculously all members of the Mont-Blanc crew were rescued, although one later died of his wounds.

But for Halifax, the toll was much worse. More than 1,900 lost their lives. 250 of the bodies were never identified. 1,630 houses were destroyed and another 12,000 damaged.

Halifax emerged from the Mont-Blanc disaster a better and safer place. The city tightened its harbor regulations and made significant improvements to its public health and hospital systems after the tragedy.

Let's all hope that the reaction of Halifax serves as a model and an inspiration to BP and indeed all companies that suffer workplace tragedies.

Halifax after the explosion

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